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1 Introduction
Growth theory has often been perceived by development economists as being
orthogonal to their main concern, namely, that of understanding the sources
of persistent poverty and stagnation in households and villages, and of design-
ing policies aimed at overcoming them. Growth theory, they would argue, is
a subdiscipline of macroeconomics: it features economies with representative
producers and consumers; and it focuses on aggregate savings and the role of
physical or human capital accumulation in long-run growth and convergence.
In particular, growth theory is not so concerned with poverty and inequality
between rich and poor individuals within a country.
Empirical growth studies have been equally perceived as being too aggregate:
most often carried out at a cross-country level, they involve aggregate variables
such as average per capita gross domestic product (GDP), average total factor
productivity (TFP), average savings rate, average measures of nancial devel-
opment, or average education indicators. In contrast, by focusing directly on
households and local institutions and infrastructure, and by using highly tar-
geted control experiments to evaluate the e¤ectiveness of such institutions in
a particular community or village, development economists feel entitled to be-
lieve that they have found the right approach to deal with the issue of poverty
alleviation, and of how to close the gap between rich and poor.
This paper is an attempt to break the divide between growth and develop-
ment economics. Using the example of India over the past decades, we argue
that innovation and/or productivity growth have been main engines of poverty
reduction in that country. We also argue that new growth theories can shed
light on this process. Moreover, these can also explain why growth and poverty
reduction has not occurred in Latin America. The reminder of this essay is
organized as follows. In Section 2 we summarize what is currently known about
the recent evolution of growth and poverty indicators in India over the past four
decades. In Section 3, we provide a very brief presentation of new growth theory
and of some of its main predictions. In Section 4 we use our description of new
growth theory to analyze the reform process in India. In Section 5, we show
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that the 1991 reforms have had unequalizing e¤ects on productivity and prof-
itability across industries and states. Finally, in Section 6 we reect upon the
contrasting experience of Asia and Latin America with regard to productivity
growth and poverty alleviation.
2 Some recent ndings on growth, poverty and
inequality in India
It is a well established fact that poverty started a pronounced and steady decline
in India as of the 1960s and 1970s (see Datt and Ravallion (1998)). But mean-
while there was little growth in the manufacturing sector. So what explains
this reduction in poverty? Here, the now well-established answer is that it is
the green revolution and the resulting boost to productivity in agriculture, that
made it happen1 . That is, the di¤usion of a new fundamental innovation to
the entire agricultural sector, and its spillovers onto the urban sector -via its
e¤ects on food prices and wages2 . Somewhat surprisingly, this declining poverty
trend has been sustained over the past two decades, even though the productiv-
ity impact of the green revolution had been largely exhausted. In their recent
paper on "Poverty and Inequality in India", Angus Deaton and Jean Drèze
(2002) analyze the recent evolutions of inequality and poverty in India over the
past decades. They use survey data provided by three quinquennial rounds
of questionnaires (respectively conducted over time intervals 1987-1988, 1993-
1994, and 1999-2000) on householdsconsumption of a given set of durable and
non-durable goods. This information in turn is used to evaluate the number of
individuals that lie below the poverty line divided by the total population, or
the so-called "head-count ratio".
The rst main nding reported by Deaton and Drèze (see Table 1 below)
is that, even after one adjusts for changes in the design of questionnaires from
one round to the next (o¢ cial methodology), or for changes in price indexes
over time (adjusted methodology), poverty both in rural and urban areas, has
substantially declined over the past twenty years.
TABLE 1 : Poverty Reduction in India
Headcount Ratios (100%)
1As well explained in Todaro and Smith (2003), "after the green revolution of the late
1960s and early 1970s, agricultural production started increasing at an annual rate of 3%.
This was largely due to improvements in agricultural technologies and irrigation systems. As
a result, India became self-su¢ cient in grain production. It was able to increase its wheat
production from 10 million tons in 1964 to over 45 million tons in 1985."
2See Eswaran and Kotwal (1994). We thank Dilip Mookherjee for pointing this reference
to us.
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O¢ cial Adjusted
Methodologya Estimatesb
1987-88 1993-94 1999-00 1987-88 1993-94 1999-00
Rural 39.4 37.1 26.8 39.0 33.0 26.3
Urban 39.1 32.9 24.1 22.5 17.8 12.0
a. Consumption data from the Planning Commission National Sample Survey
b. Consumption data adjusted for improved comparability, and price indexes
Source: Deaton, Angus, and Drèze (2002)
Deaton and Drèze also nd the same pattern when using poverty gap or
agricultural wage measures instead of the headcount. A second nding is that
consumption inequality across individual households, has increased between the
period 1993-1994 and the period 1999-2000, which in turn is consistent with
Abhijit Banerjee and Thomas Pikettys (2001) nding of a substantial increase
in income inequality among the highest income earners. Moreover, such ndings
are consistent with the result encountered in the 2004 article by Philippe Aghion,
Robin Burgess, Stephen Redding, and Fabrizio Zilibotti ( (ABRZ) that the
variance of prots across registered manufacturing rms in India, has increased
dramatically since 1991.
Now, what has happened to growth over the same period? Here, the most
informative study is by Dani Rodrik and Arvind Subramanian (2004), who nd
(see Table 2 below) that after a prolonged stagnation, all productivity variables,
namely real per capita GDP, real GDP per worker, and TFP, have taken o¤since
the early 1980s and kept growing at a sustained high rate ever since.
TABLE 2 : Average Growth Rates in India
1960  70 1970  80 1980  1990 1990  99
IMF Estimates
Output 3:75 3:16 5:64 5:61
Output per worker 1:77 0:86 3:69 3:30
Total Factor Productivity 1:17 0:47 2:89 2:44
*Source: Table 1 in Rodrik - Subramanian (2004)
Thus, a very rst look at the past four decades suggests that the green
revolution rst, and then the advent of sustained productivity growth in the
manufacturing sector, explain this poverty alleviation phenomenon to a large
extent. In both instances, technology and entrepreneurship in the rural and
then in the urban sectors, have played a key role. This brings us to the next
section.
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3 New growth theory in a nutshell
Three main ideas underlie the new theories of endogenous technical progress3 .
First, productivity growth is primarily driven by the rate of technological inno-
vations, in the form of new products, new processes, and new ways of organizing
production. Second, most innovations are the result of entrepreneurial activi-
ties or investments, e.g R&D investments, which involve risky experimentation
and learning. Third, the incentive to engage in innovative investments is itself
a¤ected by the economic environment.
Here are ve prime examples of institutions and/or policies that a¤ect long-
run productivity growth through their impact on entrepreneursincentives, or
through their ability to make innovative investments:
1. An e¤ective education system will have a positive e¤ect on long-run pro-
ductivity growth, both by increasing the e¢ ciency of innovation technolo-
gies and investments (both are highly skill intensive) and also by reducing
the cost of skill labor which in turn increases the prots that accrue to suc-
cessful innovators. As shown by Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) or Krueger
and Lindhal (2001), a higher stock of human capital increases countries
ability both to innovate at the frontier and also to imitate more advanced
technologies.4
2. A legal environment that allows entrepreneurs to appropriate a signi-
cant fraction of the revenues generated by their innovative investments.
In particular, better protection of (intellectual) property rights or a la-
bor market which is not too unfavorable to employers, will enhance the
expected prots from innovation and thereby encourage innovative invest-
ments and productivity growth. That better property right protection is
growth enhancing, has been widely established by economic history of the
past two centuries, and it comes out very clearly from the recent work on
the economics of institutions (e.g see La Porta et al (1998), Hall and Jones
(1999), and Acemoglu et al (2001)). The role of labor market regulations
is equally important as we show in Aghion, Burgess, Redding and Zilibotti
(2004) and report in Section 4 below.
3. Macroeconomic stability also tends to foster long-term productivity growth
5 ; it reduces interest rates and therefore increases the present discounted
value of rents to a successful innovator and, more generally, it encourages
entrepreneurs to be more forward-looking and emphasize R&D as well as
other types of long-term innovative investments over time. As recently
3See Romer (1990) and Aghion-Howitt (1992, 1998).
4Vandenbussche, Aghion, and Meghir (2004) use similar cross-country panel data to show
that the closer a country initially lies with respect to the technological frontier, the higher the
relative importance of higher education relative to primary/secondary education for produc-
tivity growth.
5Cross-country evidence of a negative correlation between volatility and growth, was rst
provided by Ramey and Ramey (1995). See also Aghion, Angeletos, Banerjee and Manova
(2004).
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shown by Aghion, Angeletos, Banerjee, and Manova (2004), the latter is
particularly true in countries with lower levels of nancial development.
4. As shown by Levine et al 6 , nancial development is of paramount im-
portance for long-run productivity growth, as it makes it easier for entre-
preneurs to nance their innovative investments. More recently, Aghion,
Howitt and Mayer (2004) show that nancial development is a key vari-
able explaining why some countries converge towards the technological
frontier whereas other countries diverge. The same considerations can
explain why, within a given country, some rms or sectors grow faster
than others. They can also explain why productivity growth may in-
crease inequality. This in turn follows from the following considerations:
(i) in an environment with credit constraints, rms cannot borrow more
than a multiple of their current prots; (ii) the current equilibrium prots
of a rm are typically proportional to its current productivity; (iii) the
R&D cost of catching up with the technological frontier, is typically pro-
portional to the frontier productivity level. Thus, the lower the current
productivity of a rm, the more costly it is for that rm to catch up with
the technological frontier, and therefore the lower the probability of tech-
nological catch-up. Hence, in an economy with low nancial development,
rms that are initially closer to the technological frontier will tend to grow
faster than rms initially further below the frontier.
5. Higher competition among incumbent rms and/or a higher entry threat
(e.g as induced by trade liberalization or a reduction in entry or licensing
costs), will tend to encourage innovations by incumbent rms aimed pre-
cisely at escaping competition or entry by potential rivals. The incentive
to react to higher entry threat or higher competition by increasing innov-
ative investments, will tend to be higher for rms technologically close to
their competitors in the same industry or to potential entrants at the tech-
nological frontier. Those are indeed the most likely to escape competition
or entry through innovating. On the other hand, higher competition or
entry will have either no e¤ect or a negative e¤ect on backward rms which
stand little chance of competing in the post-liberalization environment.7
Our view is that the new growth approach outlined in this section provides
good lenses whereby to interpret the recent poverty reduction in India. While
the relation between the new growth approach and the Green Revolution is well
established8 , in the next section we shall argue that this approach is equally
relevant to understand what happened to growth and poverty over the past two
decades.
6 In particular, see King and Levine (1993) and Levine et al (2002).
7See Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Gri¢ th and Howitt (2004), Aghion, Burgess, Redding and
Zilibotti (2004) and Aghion, Blundell, Gri¢ th, Howitt, and Prantl (2004).
8See the 1998 World Development Report. which o¤ers a detailed description of the Green
Revolution and of how its di¤usion was facilitated by suitable government policy on education,
intellectual property, FDI, technological licensing, and by "vast programs to help focus public
(research) laboratories on the needs of productive sector".
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4 Two waves of growth-enhancing reforms in In-
dia
There is a debate on what triggered the Indian growth takeo¤. On the one
hand, ABRZ emphasize the importance of the 1991 reforms. They argue that
up this point, rms and industries were constrained both, internally by perva-
sive central government control through public ownership and a tight control
over licensing, and externally by high tari¤ and non-tari¤ barriers and controls
on foreign direct investment. As a response to the balance of trade crisis, a
New Industrial Policy was introduced in 1991, pretty much in line with what
the new growth theories outlined in the previous section might suggest, namely:
(i) trade liberalization, with a 51% reduction in tari¤s over 97% of products,
which increased competition and entry; (ii) a boost to foreign direct invest-
ment, with the automatic approval of foreign technology agreements involving
up to 51% of foreign equity participations in a large number of industries; this
would both, foster entry and also allow the Indian enterprise sector to partly
circumvent nancial constraints; (iii) deregulation, with a substantial easing on
procedures to start up a new production unit or manufacture new products,
and privatization, with a dramatic reduction in the number of sectors reserved
for public sector, would further encourage innovation by incumbent rms and
also stimulate entry; (iv) further expansion on allowed production capacities
and reductions in corporate income tax, which increased entrepreneursability
to appropriate the reward from their innovative investments.
However, Rodrik and Subramanian (2002) showed that the Indian take-o¤
predates the 1991 reforms and dates back to the early 1980s. But then, can we
really attribute the high growth rates of the past decade to the liberalization
reforms of 1991? Or did growth over the whole period result instead from other
changes that occurred in 1980 or before and would have much less to do with
what new growth theories suggest?
In fact Rodrik and Subramanian (2002) identify two phases in the Indian
growth experience of the last two decades: there is rst what they call the phase
of "pro-business" reforms, starting in 1980 with the return of Indira Gandhi and
the subsequent rise of Rajiv Gandhi. What the two leaders did was to send a
clear signal to the enterprise sector that the Congress Party and the Indian gov-
ernment would abandon its previous pro-socialism and pro-poor rhetoric and
favor the expansion of existing private companies through pro-business mea-
sures such as the ease of restriction on capacity expansion, the removal of price
controls, and the reduction of corporate taxes. While this reform package did
not emphasize trade or entry liberalization, yet if we believe the new growth
approach outlined above, all these measures should be expected to foster pro-
ductivity growth by increasing incumbent entrepreneursability to appropriate
the rents from their innovative investments. And indeed, this policy shift by the
Indian government was to be followed by a growth acceleration which in turn
was primarily due to a continuous increase in productivity, and to a lesser ex-
tent to factor accumulation. That the sequencing between the policy change and
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the growth takeo¤ was not spurious but rather reected a causal relationship,
is shown by Rodrik and Subramanian in two ways: rst, they show that the
growth upsurge has been more pronounced in Indian states where members of
the local government belonged (or were allied with) the ruling Congress Party;
second, there was a signicant shift in private investment from the household
to the manufacturing sector, which in turn reects a positive reaction of the
private sector to what they perceive as an improved investment climate.
As explained above, it is not until 1991 that markets and trade were truly
liberalized, and here starts the second phase of the Indian growth experience.
As argued in the previous section, higher competition and entry should be ex-
pected to further encourage innovative investments aimed as escaping them,
which in turn would explain why growth continued at the same rate during the
1990s in spite of the balance of trade crisis. However, unlike in the 1980s, in the
1990s poverty reduction appears to have slowed down and poverty levels even
uctuated in the early 1990s. As we shall argue in the next section, such uctu-
ations might be explained by the fact that trade liberalizations entails winners
and losers, both within and across sectors.
5 The unequalizing e¤ects of the Indian liberal-
ization experience
ABRZ (2004) analyze the impact of liberalization on the performance of reg-
istered manufacturing rms.9 They run panel regressions of performance mea-
sures such as TFP growth or protability in a particular industry in a particular
state at a particular time. They regress these performance measures over: (i)
the pre-reform proximity of the state-industry to the Indian technological fron-
tier (dened as labor productivity in the 3-digit state-industry in 1990 divided
by labor productivity in the most productive 3-digit state-industry in that year);
(ii) a dummy variable that captures the liberalization reform: this variable is
equal to zero before 1991 and to one thereafter., (iii) labor market institutions
at the state level, and in particular the extent to which labor regulations in
the state are more "pro-employer" or more "pro-employee" relative to other
states. To capture state-level institutions, ABRZ follow Besley and Burgess
(2003) which uses the number and direction (pro-employer or pro-employee) of
the state-level amendments to the central 1947 Industrial Disputes Act to mea-
sure the extent to which the labor regulations are more pro-employer or more
pro-employees in the di¤erent states of India. They look at both, whether the
direction of regulatory change over the 1980-1997 period a¤ected industry per-
formance and whether pre-reform labor market institutions a¤ected post-reform
performance. ABRZ also control for state-industry and year xed e¤ects, and
the standard errors are adjusted for clustering by state to deal with problems
of serial correlation.
9These correspond to rms with more than 10 employees. Over the period 1980-1997, these
rms account for 10% of GDP, i.e twice as much as the unregistered sector.
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The key empirical results from ABRZ can be summarized as follows: TFP,
investment and protability respond more positively to the liberalization reform
in industries that are initially closer to the technological frontier. Moreover,
technological progress and the growth in protability are slower in industries lo-
cated in more pro-employee states; this is fully consistent with the view put for-
ward by new growth theories, that the institutional environment in which rms
operate, a¤ect their investments incentives and subsequently their productiv-
ity growth performance. Finally, liberalization increases the negative impact of
pro-worker regulations on productivity growth. Thus, greater rent extraction by
workers reduces rmsincentives to ght entry through more intense innovative
investments. That investments reacted in the same heterogenous way as prof-
itability and productivity across rms in di¤erent states or at di¤erent distances
from their industry frontier, is direct evidence that what happened during the
1990s, amounted to more than a pure selection between rms that were intrin-
sically more performing and therefore could better withstand the liberalization
shock and the less performing rms that such reforms would condemn to obso-
lescence. Rather, as predicted by the new growth theories, it is through their
e¤ects on rmsinvestment incentives in di¤erent states and industries that the
liberalization reforms a¤ected subsequent productivity growth. And it is be-
cause rms incentives to innovate and respond to the increased entry threat
di¤ered across states and across initial levels of technological development, that
we observed a heterogeneous growth response to these reforms.
Thus, the liberalization reforms of 1991 increased average productivity and
protability over the subsequent decade, but it also increased inequality. And
while poverty reduction slowed down, it occurred nevertheless on average over
the whole period.
6 Why did poverty reduction occur in Asia and
not in Latin America?
In our discussion so far we tried to argue that poverty alleviation and economic
development should also be addressed from a macro-growth perspective, not just
from a pure micro-household viewpoint. However, someone critical of our way
of thinking, would bring out the example of Latin American countries where
poverty indicators have deteriorated over the past decades even though (or may
be because of) these countries implemented a "Washington consensus" type of
package (price and trade liberalization, privatization, and stabilization). Inter-
estingly, neither poverty nor growth indicators have improved in those countries
during the recent period, so that Latin America is not a counter-example to
begin with. Yet, it is worth understanding why Latin American countries are
not growing. Part of a possible answer to this question relies on the combi-
nation of three elements: inequality, education, and trade. First, inequality,
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which is higher in Latin America than in Asia10 . As suggested by Alesina and
Rodrik (1994) or Benabou (1996), too much inequality tends to be detrimental
to growth especially in less developed countries. Second, education, which is
far more widespread in East Asian countries like Korea or Hong Kong than in
Latin America. Third, trade: East Asian countries and more recently China,
have followed more aggressive export promotion strategies combined with high
investments of physical and human capital. Another part of the answer to the
above question, may thus lie in di¤erences in growth strategies pursued by dif-
ferent countries and regions: on the one hand, through their export promotion
policies Asian countries have targeted their e¤orts on imitating the most innov-
ative sectors in developed countries, whereas Latin American countries followed
import substitution policies driven by the local market and by a static view of
comparative advantage.
The reasons why these growth-enhancing factors are missing in some parts
of the world and not in others, has been the subject of a fast-growing litera-
ture on the economics of institutions (see La Porta et al (1997), Hall and Jones
(2000) and Acemoglu et al (2001)). But this literature has not yet delivered rec-
ommendations on new mechanisms that might potentially help overcome legal
and political obstacles to the implementation of more e¤ective pro-education,
pro-health, pro-private-sector growth, policies. But here is precisely where, we
believe, the growth and household approaches can be reconciled into a renewed
theory of development. More specically, to maximize the e¤ectiveness of top-
down growth-enhancing government programs, we see a role for nongovernmen-
tal organizations (NGOs) to monitor the implementation of these programs.
For example, micronance institutions, most of which are NGOs, have vested
interests in envigilating household participation in health and education pro-
grams while monitoring the quality of these programs, in addition to obviously
helping to promote nancial development and the banking sector. However, in
the absence of top-down strategies, all what these micronance institutions have
achieved is to help people survive within poverty, and not to grow out of it, as
shown by recent empirical evidence (see Armendariz and Morduch (2004)).
10 In its 1998 World Development Report, the World Bank estimated that the average Gini
coe¢ cients for Latin America and East Asia, were respectively equal to 0.49 and 0.40, which
indeed reects a higher level of inequality in Latin America compared to East Asia.
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